In 2008, Illinois enacted sweeping reform of its civil commitment standards. The old criteria, limiting commitment to people with mental illness posing an imminent danger to themselves or others, were expanded to get help to those who, while not violent or suicidal at the moment, are unable to provide for their own basic physical needs, or are unable to understand their need for treatment and can reasonably be expected to suffer continued deterioration and engage in dangerous conduct in the future.

The case of a 31-year-old man identified in court papers as “Torski C.” speaks to the need for Illinois’ reforms.  Last November, Mr. C.’s mother petitioned for his involuntary hospital admission under the new standard.  Four clinicians examined Mr. C and all concluded that he was in need of inpatient care due to his delusions and paranoia.  At the commitment hearing, Mr. C.’s mother testified that her son claims to see angels and “little bitty people,” travel to heaven, and speak directly to God.

While it was not alleged that Mr. C. had specifically threatened to harm anyone or claimed that God had instructed him to do so, his mother testified that he had warned her that he would do whatever God commanded, including killing his 15-month-old son if so instructed.  She further testified that he carried a gun at all times, and that he told her that God had told him that he needed to leave town because if he did not, either someone was going to kill him or he was going to kill someone else.

To anyone new to the curious world of involuntary commitment law, this might sound like an easy case of imminent danger, enough to trigger hospitalization in any state.  But in practice, the absence of any specific threat or violent act would make it hard to commit Mr. C. for dangerousness.  This, of course, is precisely why Illinois expanded its law.  The trial court agreed with Mr. C.’s mother and doctors that he met the new standard of needing treatment to avoid continued deterioration likely to result in dangerous conduct, and ordered Mr. C. hospitalized for up to 90 days.

Happy ending?  Not so fast.  Last month, an Illinois appellate court vacated the trial court’s ruling on the grounds that the new law is “void for vagueness.”  Specifically, the court objected to the statute’s definition of the “dangerous conduct” in which the person’s continued deterioration is likely to result.  The definition includes, in relevant part “threatening behavior or conduct that places another individual in reasonable expectation of being harmed.”  The court found such wording so broad as to encompass conduct causing mere emotional harm (for example, shouting racial slurs), insufficient to justify an interference with personal liberty under the state's police power.  (Lawyers will note this is really an "overbreadth" finding rather than one of "vagueness," but we suppose that's just bookkeeping.)

While the ruling has NO impact on the laws of other states (many of which have progressive treatment standards that have withstood court challenge -- see e.g., Wisconsin, Washington State, Hawaii), the consequence of this decision within Illinois is great (although not for Mr. C. himself, whose involuntary commitment has long since expired).  It renders the new commitment standard void in the part of the state under this appellate court’s jurisdiction, and sets the stage for the Illinois Supreme Court to decide the law’s ultimate fate.

For our part, we take no issue with the court’s determination that the statute should not apply to anyone whose continued deterioration is likely to result in nothing more than hurt feelings.  We do take issue with the decision to nullify the statute, and not just because it has blockaded a desperately needed and hard-won avenue into treatment for mentally ill Illinoisans.  The fact is, it was entirely unnecessary.  Laws reflect the will of the people, and should not be obliterated lightly.  Instead of nullification, a court may choose to repair an overly broad statute by means of a "narrowing interpretation."  In this case, that would have simply meant reading into the statute that “threatening” means physically threatening and that “places another individual in reasonable expectation of being harmed” refers to physical harm.   Given the facts of the case, this more exacting standard would easily have been met.

Here’s hoping the Illinois Supreme Court shows greater restraint.  Stay tuned.